Showing posts with label chapter outlines. Show all posts
Showing posts with label chapter outlines. Show all posts
27 January 2011
Equity and Prop Desks
Below is a brief passage from what may become the third chapter of my proposed book as represented in the table of contents I provided on December 10, 2010.
This complements materials I've provided for the two previous chapters, and we will continue our march in a measured pace.
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3. Equity and Prop Desks
The distinction between equity and debt is critical to any serious discussion of modern finance. It is also, not coincidentally, critical to the understanding of corporate liquidations or reorganizations. We will begin there, and soon enough we’ll be discussing corporate governance, government regulation, and the mysteries of federalism.
Think of a newly bankrupt corporation as a see-saw with a much heavier weight on the left and a lighter weight on the right. The right end, then, is up in the air. The left end (the equity) sits on the ground. The fulcrum is in the middle.
In terms of the right to receive a payoff, the most senior debt has first dibs. This is the airiest part of the see-saw. After those debts are paid off, payments follow in a sequence defined by contract and law. In time, the liquidators of the estate come to the fulcrum – the point at which what remains to be distributed is the good will of the ongoing enterprise.
Let’s assume that there is some such value (if not, we’d be dealing with a liquidation rather than a reorganization). On this assumption, the holders of the “fulcrum security” will be reimbursed by the transformation of their securities into the equity of the reorganized company. The classes of security that are lower than the fulcrum security, including the holders of the old equity, will get nothing.
One quick way of expressing all of this is to say that the holders of the equity of a company are the ones who bear the “residual risk.” They are the ones most certain to lose out in the event of liquidation. Thus, their interests are aligned with the interests of the corporation as a continuing, sustainable, entity.
To use a serious maritime image rather than the frivolous playground imagery above, we might say this: it is because the captain would go down with the ship, in accord with maritime tradition, that the captain is the best one to entrust with the task of steering the ship safely. Passengers with secure access to a rowboat in the event of a mishap are less suitable for the task.
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A footnote in there may refer to “Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases and the Delaware Myth” by Harvey R. Miller (2002), an article that sought to rebut the widespread impression, the “myth” that “there is something fundamentally wrong, even reckless, with the reorganization process as it is practiced” in the federal bankruptcy court in bellwether Delaware.
A further theme of the chapter as it develops will be the critical role of speculation in uncovering the real value of assets. Specifically, the equity markets (and their speculators) reveal the value of an ongoing enterprise as its market cap. The difficulties caused by regulations that obscure that process, thus hiding the true value. Prices as data. Leonard Read’s pencil.
From there to the role of shorts, a return to the Enron scandal, what Skilling called a certain short. Hedge funds and the prop desks of banks.
This complements materials I've provided for the two previous chapters, and we will continue our march in a measured pace.
--------------
3. Equity and Prop Desks
The distinction between equity and debt is critical to any serious discussion of modern finance. It is also, not coincidentally, critical to the understanding of corporate liquidations or reorganizations. We will begin there, and soon enough we’ll be discussing corporate governance, government regulation, and the mysteries of federalism.
Think of a newly bankrupt corporation as a see-saw with a much heavier weight on the left and a lighter weight on the right. The right end, then, is up in the air. The left end (the equity) sits on the ground. The fulcrum is in the middle.
In terms of the right to receive a payoff, the most senior debt has first dibs. This is the airiest part of the see-saw. After those debts are paid off, payments follow in a sequence defined by contract and law. In time, the liquidators of the estate come to the fulcrum – the point at which what remains to be distributed is the good will of the ongoing enterprise.
Let’s assume that there is some such value (if not, we’d be dealing with a liquidation rather than a reorganization). On this assumption, the holders of the “fulcrum security” will be reimbursed by the transformation of their securities into the equity of the reorganized company. The classes of security that are lower than the fulcrum security, including the holders of the old equity, will get nothing.
One quick way of expressing all of this is to say that the holders of the equity of a company are the ones who bear the “residual risk.” They are the ones most certain to lose out in the event of liquidation. Thus, their interests are aligned with the interests of the corporation as a continuing, sustainable, entity.
To use a serious maritime image rather than the frivolous playground imagery above, we might say this: it is because the captain would go down with the ship, in accord with maritime tradition, that the captain is the best one to entrust with the task of steering the ship safely. Passengers with secure access to a rowboat in the event of a mishap are less suitable for the task.
--------
A footnote in there may refer to “Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases and the Delaware Myth” by Harvey R. Miller (2002), an article that sought to rebut the widespread impression, the “myth” that “there is something fundamentally wrong, even reckless, with the reorganization process as it is practiced” in the federal bankruptcy court in bellwether Delaware.
A further theme of the chapter as it develops will be the critical role of speculation in uncovering the real value of assets. Specifically, the equity markets (and their speculators) reveal the value of an ongoing enterprise as its market cap. The difficulties caused by regulations that obscure that process, thus hiding the true value. Prices as data. Leonard Read’s pencil.
From there to the role of shorts, a return to the Enron scandal, what Skilling called a certain short. Hedge funds and the prop desks of banks.
09 January 2011
Sample Chapter, Comments Welcome
I'm posting a full chapter of my work-in-progress.
As regular readers know, I'm at work on a book I'm called Gambling With Borrowed Chips. Its about the crisis of 2007-08, although in a more analytical sense than that which applies to most of the books currently available 'about' that subject. It suggests the deep history behind that crisis, and the way forward from here.
Chapter 2 will discuss the history of debt and interest payments.
Your comments are welcome. The chapter is here.
As regular readers know, I'm at work on a book I'm called Gambling With Borrowed Chips. Its about the crisis of 2007-08, although in a more analytical sense than that which applies to most of the books currently available 'about' that subject. It suggests the deep history behind that crisis, and the way forward from here.
Chapter 2 will discuss the history of debt and interest payments.
Your comments are welcome. The chapter is here.
Labels:
2007,
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Reformation,
Renaissance,
sample chapter,
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23 December 2010
From Florence to Houston
Below is an outline for the second chapter as represented in the table of contents for my projected book.
I've already done the same for the first chapter. We will focus here on the institution of lending money for a fixed rate of interest: this is "usury" or "riba" to its foes.
I. Renaissance Florence
A. Theology, Damnation, and Evasion
B. The Rise of the Medici
II. The North of Europe
A. Luther on usury
B. Calvin
C. Calvinism in the Lowlands
D. London and the Classical Economists
III. Colonies and States
A. Debt in the Colonies
B. Debt and the Founders
C. The Post-Classical Economics of Henry George
Here I will make in essence the points I sought to make in this blog on November 19, 2010.
D. Leverage, the Business Cycle, and Enron
The difficulties that arise when finance becomes too disconnected from the physical world, when an excess of liquidity gives rise to dreams of infinite leverage, are well illustrated in the rise and fall of the now infamous energy-trading firm, and it is a cautionary tale we should heed even this early in our study.
We have addressed thus far the fundamental ideas of speculation and leverage (i.e. debt). We need to introduce the final key idea from our subtitle, regulation: and we will do that in the next chapter.
I've already done the same for the first chapter. We will focus here on the institution of lending money for a fixed rate of interest: this is "usury" or "riba" to its foes.
I. Renaissance Florence
A. Theology, Damnation, and Evasion
B. The Rise of the Medici
II. The North of Europe
A. Luther on usury
B. Calvin
C. Calvinism in the Lowlands
D. London and the Classical Economists
III. Colonies and States
A. Debt in the Colonies
B. Debt and the Founders
C. The Post-Classical Economics of Henry George
Here I will make in essence the points I sought to make in this blog on November 19, 2010.
D. Leverage, the Business Cycle, and Enron
The difficulties that arise when finance becomes too disconnected from the physical world, when an excess of liquidity gives rise to dreams of infinite leverage, are well illustrated in the rise and fall of the now infamous energy-trading firm, and it is a cautionary tale we should heed even this early in our study.
We have addressed thus far the fundamental ideas of speculation and leverage (i.e. debt). We need to introduce the final key idea from our subtitle, regulation: and we will do that in the next chapter.
Labels:
chapter outlines,
John Calvin,
leverage,
Martin Luther,
Medici,
regulation,
Renaissance,
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11 December 2010
The Old Stigma: Speculators as Parasites
I plan to fill in a bit here the first chapter as represented in the table of contents of my projected book. See yesterday's post for the context.
This chapter will flesh out the claim in the introduction that "a very old stigma of the speculator as an anti-social parasite has re-emerged."
I. Russia
A. Dostoyevsky's Raskolnikov and the death of a pawn broker
B. To the 20th century: who were the kulaks?
1. their speculations
2. their stigmatization
3. their deaths.
II. "But that was all so long ago!"
III. The CDS Market as our pawn brokers
A. What is a CDS market?
B. Consider a column Ben Stein wrote in The New York Times back when he was writing for them.
C. Or consider Goldman Sachs as "vampire squid" and the barrage of Congressional investigations.
D. Short course: why CDS' should not be scary.
IV. Transition.
If they are not in fact parasites, what function do they serve? That brings us into the next chapter.
This chapter will flesh out the claim in the introduction that "a very old stigma of the speculator as an anti-social parasite has re-emerged."
I. Russia
A. Dostoyevsky's Raskolnikov and the death of a pawn broker
B. To the 20th century: who were the kulaks?
1. their speculations
2. their stigmatization
3. their deaths.
II. "But that was all so long ago!"
III. The CDS Market as our pawn brokers
A. What is a CDS market?
B. Consider a column Ben Stein wrote in The New York Times back when he was writing for them.
C. Or consider Goldman Sachs as "vampire squid" and the barrage of Congressional investigations.
D. Short course: why CDS' should not be scary.
IV. Transition.
If they are not in fact parasites, what function do they serve? That brings us into the next chapter.
Labels:
Ben Stein,
CDS,
chapter outlines,
Goldman Sachs,
kulaks,
speculators
10 December 2010
My Book Proposal
Listen up publishers. Here's a book proposal.
I'd like you to bid on rights to my not-yet-complete manuscript, Gambling With Borrowed Chips: The Role of Leverage, Speculation, and Regulation in a Modern Economy.
I am willing to accept millions, though hundreds of millions would be nice.
When complete, this will be a scholarly ms of approximately 76,000 words, with approx. 30 figures in the text, and extensive endnotes for each chapter, an index, and a bibliography.
As I complete outlines of each chapter in subsequent posts, I'll use the chapter titles here as links, for convenient navigation.
Synopsis
Speculation performs at least three indirect but valuable roles that assist a broader society in the wise allocation of resources: it allows commercial parties to hedge their positions; it uncovers the real value of assets; and it creates accountability for corporate managers, who in the absence of active speculators are better positioned to entrench themselves.
Speculative activity can become excessive and abusive -- the best check upon this, though, is not through regulation, much less criminalization -- the best check is the systemic one of a hard money policy.
The events of recent years -- as they have been popularly misunderstod -- have delegitimized this valuable activity, and that has given rise to a lot of real and threatened policy consequences that have done or would do more harm than good. Or, to be more precise, a very old stigma of the speculator as an anti-social parasite has re-emerged.
Outline
Introduction
Part One: The Value of Speculation
Chapters
1. The old stigma: speculators as parasites
2. From Florence to Houston
3. Equity and Prop Desks
4. The Crisis of 2008
5. Commodities and Their Derivatives
6. Betting on Foreign Exchange
7. Accounting and Valuation
8. Corporations and Accountability.
Part Two: Important Abstractions
Chapters
9. Efficient Capital Markets, A Tidy Theory.
10. ECMH, The Much Sloppier Practice.
11. On Greed and Money.
12. A World Without a Monetary Superpower
Part Three: Some Policy Consequences
Chapters
13. Bankruptcies and Rescues.
14. Public and Private Pensions.
15. Home Ownership.
16. Energy.
17. Conclusion.
I'd like you to bid on rights to my not-yet-complete manuscript, Gambling With Borrowed Chips: The Role of Leverage, Speculation, and Regulation in a Modern Economy.
I am willing to accept millions, though hundreds of millions would be nice.
When complete, this will be a scholarly ms of approximately 76,000 words, with approx. 30 figures in the text, and extensive endnotes for each chapter, an index, and a bibliography.
As I complete outlines of each chapter in subsequent posts, I'll use the chapter titles here as links, for convenient navigation.
Synopsis
Speculation performs at least three indirect but valuable roles that assist a broader society in the wise allocation of resources: it allows commercial parties to hedge their positions; it uncovers the real value of assets; and it creates accountability for corporate managers, who in the absence of active speculators are better positioned to entrench themselves.
Speculative activity can become excessive and abusive -- the best check upon this, though, is not through regulation, much less criminalization -- the best check is the systemic one of a hard money policy.
The events of recent years -- as they have been popularly misunderstod -- have delegitimized this valuable activity, and that has given rise to a lot of real and threatened policy consequences that have done or would do more harm than good. Or, to be more precise, a very old stigma of the speculator as an anti-social parasite has re-emerged.
Outline
Introduction
Part One: The Value of Speculation
Chapters
1. The old stigma: speculators as parasites
2. From Florence to Houston
3. Equity and Prop Desks
4. The Crisis of 2008
5. Commodities and Their Derivatives
6. Betting on Foreign Exchange
7. Accounting and Valuation
8. Corporations and Accountability.
Part Two: Important Abstractions
Chapters
9. Efficient Capital Markets, A Tidy Theory.
10. ECMH, The Much Sloppier Practice.
11. On Greed and Money.
12. A World Without a Monetary Superpower
Part Three: Some Policy Consequences
Chapters
13. Bankruptcies and Rescues.
14. Public and Private Pensions.
15. Home Ownership.
16. Energy.
17. Conclusion.
Labels:
accounting,
chapter outlines,
commodities,
derivatives,
leverage,
regulation,
Renaissance,
speculators
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Knowledge is warranted belief -- it is the body of belief that we build up because, while living in this world, we've developed good reasons for believing it. What we know, then, is what works -- and it is, necessarily, what has worked for us, each of us individually, as a first approximation. For my other blog, on the struggles for control in the corporate suites, see www.proxypartisans.blogspot.com.
